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David Brown* Sex Discrimination in Pension
Plans
I. Introduction
Legal problems involved in pension plans and the statutory
regulation of pensions have been the subject of two recent articles in
the Dalhousie Law Journal; Pensions: A Primer for Lawyers by Joel
Fichaud' and Anne Malick's comment, Private Pensions - A
Legislative Response - Nova Scotia Pension Benefits Act. 2 Sex
discrimination in employment has also been well canvassed in this
Journal in Elizabeth Lennon's article, Sex Discrimination in
Employment: The Nova Scotia Human Rights Act. 3 The purpose of
this note is to examine an issue at the nexus of these two subjects:
sex discrimination in pension plans, principally that arising from
actuarial differences in benefits and contributions for male and
female employees. What forms does discrimination in pension plans
take, is it unlawful or undesirable and if so, how is it to be remedied
in Nova Scotia?
Canada's solution to providing at least a floor income for all
Canadians upon retirement has been called the three-tier system: old
age pensions, the Canada Pension Plan and private employer-
employee pension plans. The federal government through the Old
Age Security Act 4 provides a pension to all persons aged sixty-five
or over. The basic monthly pension is the same for all regardless of
employment status or sex. In addition those eligible may receive the
guaranteed income supplement, the amount of which depends on
the pensioner's income and marital status. This plan provides the
basic income floor for all Canadians aged sixty-five years or older.
The Canada Pension Plan5 has been in operation since 1966. It
provides a guaranteed pension to all employees in Canada,
regardless of occupation, through compulsory contributions by
employer and employee, collected by the federal government.
Contributions of 1.8% of the employees' salaries are matched by the
*LL.B. Dalhousie University, 1977
1. (1975) 2Dal. L.J. 369
2. (1976) 3 Dal. L.J. 703
3. (1976) 3 Dal. L.J. 593
4. R.S.C. 1970 c. 0-6
5. R.S.C. 1970c. C-5
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employer up to the yearly maximum pensionable earnings level
(YMPE) which in 1974 was $7,400. The plan does not discriminate
between male and female: both groups pay equal contributions and
receive equal benefits according to their income. There are,
however, two points about the Canada Pension Plan that must be
made. First, the pensions are calculated to give a pension of 25% of
average earnings, so women in general, being on the average lower
income earners, will receive lower pensions. Second, the pensions
are for employed persons only with no recognition for the
contribution of a woman at home to the family unit. The third
"tier" of social security for the aged is private employer-employee
pension plans6 and it is at this level that women are most clearly
discriminated against.
The problem of sex discrimination in pension plans cannot be
seen only through actual discrepancies in particular plans. As with
the Canada Pension Plan much of the problem stems from women's
inferior status in the workforce. Women earn, on the average, thirty
per cent less than men and therefore their pensions are going to be
less than those of men. They are often on the fringe of the job
market and are, statistics show, more susceptible to layoff and
termination of employment than men. 7 More women, therefore, do
not get the opportunity to pay into pensions or do not stay long
enough to be entitled to the benefit of the employer's contributions.
In the male-oriented work world it is the husband who is
transferred. Usually this means he keeps his pension with the same
employer but the wife must change employers and she will lose her
pension "credits" under her previous employer unless she has a
vested right to those credits. The fact that most pensions are not
portable thus hits women harder than men.
Lack of portability supports the traditional view that the husband
as the primary earner needs a pension; for women it is not
important. Discrimination in favour of "head of household" and
related criteria ignore the contribution married women make to their
families' income; a contribution the family cannot be expected to do
without when retirement age arrives. In 1974, 51.9% of all single
women and 36.7% of all married women were participating in the
workforce. Ignored by these statistics are the many women who are
divorced, separated or widowed by the time they reach retirement
6. Pension Plans In Canada, 1970 Statistics Canada Table B, p. 12
7. Women in the Workforce, 1975 Facts and Figures, Information Canada,
Table 3
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age and who must provide income from only one source, their own.
It is no longer acceptable for pension plans in general to ignore the
role of working women in the economy.
What are the more specific forms of discrimination against
women found in pension plans?
II. Eligibility or Access
In 1970 there were 2,690,000 females and 5,640,000 males in the
workforce but only 735,490 females were covered by a pension plan
compared with 2,086,000 male employees in Canada. 8 What are the
reasons for this disproportionate coverage? In that year 3.4% of the
pension plans in effect in Canada were not available to women. 9
More commonly plans make it compulsory for men to join but
optional for women. Also, eligibility requirements vary and those
based on the period of employment in a company often discriminate
against a class of employee which has a higher proportion of
women, such as clerical workers. Union plans in many companies
cover the industrial workforce but not the clerical or administrative
staff.
III. Contributions and Benefits
Contributions and benefits are the two areas in which discrimination
has had its most serious effect and where any movement for equality
has met its toughest resistance. To understand the impact of
discrimination in this area one must look at the different types of
pensions available and how those pensions are calculated. Because
pension plans are generally regarded by pension experts to be only
properly funded if based on actuarial assumptions, the insurance
industry argues on an actuarial basis that discrimination must be
allowed.
An actuarially sound plan is one in which the employer knows the
future cost potential and arranges to meet it through an orderly
program of funding under which, should the plan terminate at any
time, present pensioners and those with vested rights would be
secure in their pensions. In determining future cost, actuaries use
mortality tables which show that women on the average live seven
years longer than men. 10 Thus is is argued that in order for a plan to
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. "Mortality tables consist of two separate tables, one for each sex, reflecting
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be actuarially sound, either pension benefits must be in smaller
monthly amounts for women or the contributions from women must
be higher. The same argument is used to justify actuarially
discounted widow benefit options in plans. But because the
insurance industry regards plans which discriminate on an actuarial
basis to be justified does not mean that all (or any) such plans are
acceptable in today's society. This is clearer if one examines the
basic types of pension plans available in Canada today.
Statistics Canada divides pension types by benefits into: (1) unit
benefit, (2) money-purchase, (3) profit-sharing and (4) flat benefit.
Unit benefit plans are by far the most popular in terms of
membership (75% of all members in Canadian plans). They include
career average earnings, average best earnings, final earnings and
final average earnings plans. The benefits are calculated by
multiplying a specified percentage by the number of years of service
under the plan by the employee's average earnings (career, best or
final). Contribution rates are estimated actuarially to provide
adequate pensions when properly invested.
Under money-purchase plans the employer takes all contributions
made to the credit of an employee and purchases an annuity from an
insurance company. The insurer will provide a monthly pension
based on the actuarial risk: hence women will receive a lower
monthly annuity than men because of the "risk" to the insurance
company.
Profit sharing plans are essentially money-purchase plans except
that employer contributions are related to profits. The employer's
contributions are not fixed but a minimum annual contribution is
usually required whether a profit is earned or not.
Flat benefit plans express the benefit as a fixed dollar amount
independent of earnings (e.g. $5 per month for each year of
service). In some plans the benefit is simply a fixed dollar amount
independent of service (e.g. pension of $100 per month). Unions
have in the past preferred this type of pension.
the fact that women as a group have a different mortality experience than men as a
group. There is considerable controversy over the reasons why women live longer
than men. Some attribute it to basic genetic and physiological differences. Others
say the difference is attributed to different degrees of stress to which men and
women are subjected. This argument is based on the assumption that men tend to
have more high-pressure jobs than women do. However, insurance companies are
not concerned with the reasons for mortality differential; they are only concerned
with the fact that it exists." From Sex Discrimination and Sex-Based Mortality
Tables" (1973) 53 Boston U. Law Rev. 624.
Sex Discrimination in Pension Plans
In Ontario Part X of the Employment Standards Act and
regulations prohibit unequal benefits or contributions by sex in unit
benefit and flat-benefit plans.1 1 The Act does allow discrepancies in
money-purchase and profit-sharing plans which are underwritten by
the insurance industry. Statistics show that prior to the enactment of
such legislation in fact 17.9% of all membership in plans had
variable contributions by sex but only 0.2% of unit benefit plans had
variable rates by sex. 1
2
IV. Survivor's Death Benefits
Some plans provide for survivor's benefits either as a return of
contributions or, as with 50% of the membership, a widow's'
3
pension 14 either before or after retirement. Invariably this pension
to the widow (in some instances it is provided to the widower) is
50% of the normal pension (60% in the Canada Pension Plan).
Again we see a double standard in providing widow or widower
benefits. Many plans do not see the propriety of granting widower
annuities. If they do the surviving spouse often has to pass a
disability or dependency test. Many plans provide an optional form
of annuity payable for life and guaranteed for five, ten or fifteen
years instead of a pension. Others offer a joint and survivorship
annuity on the member's life and that of the spouse. In all cases
these options are actuarially discounted: either the cost is higher or
the benefits lower, or both, for the female employee.
V. RetirementAge
Traditionally the normal retirement age, that is the earliest age at
which the pension plan member can retire on full pension, has been
lower for women than for men, usually sixty-five for men and sixty
for women. Today's emphasis on best or final earnings plans means
that many women thus retiring earlier receive smaller pensions than
their male counterparts who work longer. However, the difference
in normal retirement age appears to be becoming smaller.
11. (Part X) S.O. 1974 c. 112 proclaimed in force Nov. 1, 1975 and 0. Reg.
654/75 as amended 0. Reg. 884/75 effective Nov. 1, 1975.
12. Pension Plans In Canada 1970, Tables F, G
13. Ibid. Statistics Canada tables do not provide figures for 'widower' benefits. It
would be interesting to discover what percentage provided death benefits to either
spouse.
14. Ibid. Table 28
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VI. Vesting
Vesting is the ensuring of the employee's right to all or part of the
employer contributions paid on his or her behalf on termination of
employment before retirement, usually in the form of a deferred
pension payable at normal retirement age. While 6.7% of members
in Canadian pension plans enjoyed a right of immediate vesting, the
vast majority of plans have age, service and participation
requirements that must be fulfilled. 15 There are examples of
discrimination in all of these requirements but most plans have
equal vesting periods for men and women. The problems arise
where the employee leaves the labor force or leaves the employer. It
is estimated by Ralph Nader, American consumer advocate, that as
high as 80% of employees in any given plan in the United States
never see a penny of their employer's contributions because of the
mobility of the labor force, lay-offs, plant closure, bankruptcy and
misadministration of funds.' 6 The concentration of women in
short-term employment makes them, as a group, particularly
vulnerable to non-vesting for the first two of these reasons.
The new Nova Scotia Pension Benefits Act 1 7 "locks in" vested
pension credits after a statutory vesting period of 10 years of service
and 45 years of age,18 but this does not lessen the different impact
of vesting requirements on women as a group.
VII. Accountability
A related problem with pension plans, but one which does not
necessarily relate to discrimination is access to information and the
accountability of the trustees of pension plans. Trustees are usually
the officers of the employer. Major investment and administrative
decisions are made without consultation with the "beneficiaries" of
the plan. The new Pension Benefits Act is silent even as to
requirements of information to employees. The trustees may thus
have a free hand in the development of policy, even one which
discriminates on the basis of sex.
VIII. Curing Discrimination in Pension Plans in Nova Scotia
15. Ibid. Table 21
16. You and Your Pensions (1973) Ralph Nader and Kate Blackwell, Grossman
Publishers, New York
17. S.N.S. 1975, c. 14; proclaimed in effect Jan. 1, 1977
18. Ibid. section 17
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In 1972 an amendment to the Human Rights Act prohibited
discrimination based on sex:
Sec. 1 l(a)(1) No person shall deny to, or discriminate against an
individual, or class of individuals because of the sex of the
individual or class of individuals, in providing or refusing to
provide any of the following:
(d) employment, conditions of employment, or continuing
employment or the use of application forms or advertising for
employment, unless there is a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion based on sex. 19
"Conditions of employment" has been interpreted by the New
Brunswick Human Rights Commission as including pension plans.
The Ontario Employment Standards Act, Part X 20 specifically deals
with pension plans. There have been no complaints to the Nova
Scotia Human Rights Commission regarding pension plans and the
Commission has not yet set any guidelines for discrimination in
pension plans. Since any contract or term of employment which
offends the Human Rights Act is void it would be helpful if the
Commission established guidelines, especially for the benefit of the
Superintendant of Pensions under the new Pensions Benefits Act.
The Pension Benefits Act regulates through registration all
private pension plans in the province. Section 7 of the Act sets out
the functions of the Superintendant:
Sec. 7(1) The Superintendant shall (a) promote the establish-
ment, extension and improvement of pension plans throughout
Nova Scotia; (b) accept for registration all pension plans required
to be registered or filed for registration with the Superintendant
under the Act and reject any plan that does not qualify for
registration.
Presumably these powers would allow the Superintendant to
refuse to register any plan which offends the Human Rights Act or
the Labour Standards Code. 21 The Nova Scotia Act, borrowing
largely from a similar enactment in Ontario anticipates the
acceptance of plans for registration after the proper vesting, funding
and solvency requirements are met. A reading of the regulations
suggests that a plan which is actuarially sound meets the
requirements of a fully funded plan. Without further guidelines, a
pension plan that provides actuarial differences for men and women
19. S.N.S. 1969, c. 11 as amended S.N.S. 1972 c. 65
20. Supra, footnote 11
21. S.N.S. 1972, c. 10
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in benefits and contributions would be acceptable to the
Superintendant under the present Act and regulations. Section 24 of
the Act gives the Governor-in-Council the power to make
regulations for among other things:
Sec. 24(o) respecting any matter necessary or advisable to carry
out effectively, the intent and purpose of the Act.
There would be nothing therefore stopping the Superintendant
from applying, as a condition of registration, the guidelines of the
Human Rights Commission, if and when they are established.
The question, then, is what should those guidelines be? Ontario
has provided a solution through Part X (Benefit Plans) of the
Employment Standards Act. Section 34(2) of that Act provides:
Sec. 34(2) Except as provided in the regulations, no employer or
person acting directly on behalf of an employer shall provide,
furnish or offer any fund, plan, arrangement or benefit that
differentiates or makes any distinction, exclusion or preference
between his employees or a class or classes of his employees or
their beneficiaries, survivors or dependents because of the age,
sex or marital status of his employees.
The regulations allow differentiation only on an actuarial basis. In
money purchase, profit-sharing or composite plans the benefits can
vary on an actuarial basis. The employer's contribution rates shall
only vary to achieve equal benefits for male and female employees
on an actuarial basis. The Act and regulations do, however, prohibit
the "head of household" criterion and discrimination in regards to
vesting, access, retirement age or survivor's death benefits.
Apparently the Act and its regulations work well. Prior consultation
and the work of a task force prior to legislation has resulted in few
problems of non-compliance with the law. The insurance industry
has not had to make major changes to meet the requirements of the
Act.
The Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission is well aware of the
Ontario guidelines but is reluctant to adopt similar guidelines
because of the acceptance of discrimination on an actuarial basis.
The issue is whether the employer should be allowed to have his
choice of purchase formulae and in so doing provide unequal
benefits to male and female employees. More specifically should
Nova Scotia adopt the Ontario guidelines?
Recent American cases on the. U.S. federal human rights
legislation in this area, the Equal Pay Act 22 and Title VII of the
22. 29 U.S.C. 206 (d) (1970)
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Civil Rights Act 23 do not provide clear support for the Ontario
approach. The Wage and Hour Administrator, charged with
enforcement of the Equal Pay Act says the employer has a choice: it
can either have equal benefits or equal contributions. On the other
hand the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
which issues guidelines under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act has
ruled that the employer must provide equal benefits, the logical
conclusion being that unequal benefits, although based on mortality
tables, would be illegal. The difference in opinion depends on how
one applies the terms "pay and compensation" in these two statutes
to pension plans. If the terms are interpreted as referring to
contributions then benefits can be unequal as long as'the employer's
contributions are equal. If they are interpreted to include benefits
then regardless of the costs of contributions and even where an
insurance company underwrites the program, the employer must
provide equal benefits. Some commentators have suggested that
providing equal benefits is more in line with the purpose of the two
American statutes 24 but at least one, with some support from the
courts, has suggested that on a literal reading the legislation requires
equal benefits and contributions. 25 Consequently, the argument
against applying the Ontario guidelines is strengthened by the
American position.
One solution to the dilemma of actuarial tables has been
suggested by various commentators to be the unisex mortality
table. 26 A unisex table is one in which the life expectancies of male
and female lives would be merged with no distinction based on sex.
23. 42 U.S.C. para. 2000 (3) et seq. (1970)
24. See: "Sex Discrimination and Sex Based Mortality Tables" (1973)53 Bos.
U.L. Rev. 624; "Title VII and the Problem of Sex Classifications in Pension
Programs" (1974) 74Col. L. Rev. 1203; "Mortality Tables and the Sex-Stereotype
Doctrine: Inherent Discrimination in Pension Annuities" (1975) 51 Notre Dame
Lawyer.
25. Notre Dame Lawyer, supra and see Manhart v. City of Los Angeles 387 F.
Supp. 980 (C.D. Cal. 1975) in which a city department required female employees
to contribute larger monthly contributions so as to get equal benefits in accordance
with EEOC guidelines. The court held this constituted sexual discrimination. After
examining the statutes and case law the court found:
"sexual discrimination under [Title VII] exists whenever general fact
characteristics of a sex-defined class are automatically applied to an individual
within that class . .. "
The court rejected the city's submission that differentiation was justified by
actuarial tables.
26. Bos. U. Law Rev. and Col. L. Rev., supra
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Indeed, if the individual insurance contract can be considered
discriminatory these new tables might be the only non-
discriminatory form of mortality table. The implications for the
insurance industry of such far-reaching application of human rights
legislation have only been hinted at and it is too early in the
development of human rights law to predict its ultimate effect. 27
However, there are strong arguments for the unisex mortality table.
Social justice demands that female pensioners receive the same
benefit as male pensioners:
An elderly woman does not have less expensive needs than an
elderly man; she merely has less money in the form of pension
benefits with which to accommodate those needs. The survivors
who receive a man's life insurance benefits when he dies have the
same need as the survivors of a woman, but there is less money
for those needs. Mutual subsidization through a unisex mortality
table is one way of providing equally for these individuals. 28
One human rights officer suggested that differences in benefits
because the recipients were black, or Indian, would not be tolerated
although, he pointed out, a few years ago insurance companies did
have different, actuarially justified, rates for blacks and Indians
because both groups tend to die earlier than whites.
The insurance industry suggests that the unisex mortality table
would add 15% to the cost of money purchase plans. The industry
argues that sex-based groups are more in line with "individual
equity" because the rates are then more in proportion to the risk of
the individual contribution. It has been suggested on behalf of the
Human Rights Commission, however, that since the mid-sixties
money purchase plans are decreasing in popularity. These plans
now constitute only 5% of the membership in Canadian pension
plans so that considerations peculiar to such plans should not figure
seriously in the controversy of whether the unisex mortality table is
to be required by statute.
Beyond the Human Rights Act there are a number of statutes that
bear on the problem of discrimination in pension plans. The Pension
Benefits Act, as mentioned, directs the Superintendant of Pensions
to refuse to register any plan which does not conform to the
regulations and presumably to refuse any plan which does not
conform with the law.
27. On insurance see Sydlaske, V. "Gender Classification in the Insurance
Industry" (1975) 75 Col. L. Rev. 1381
28. 53 Bos. U. Law Rev. supra at p. 653
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Under the Labour Standards Code the Director of Labour
Standards and the Labour Standards Tribunal could become
involved through the application of the equal pay requirements of
section 55(1):
Sec. 55(1) An employer and any person acting on his behalf shall
not pay a female employee at a rate of wages less than the rate of
wages paid to a male employee employed by him for
substantially the same work performed in the same establish-
ment, the performance of which requires substantially equal skill,
effort and responsibility, and which is performed under similar
working conditions.
The issue is whether "wages" under s.55(1) can be defined to
include pension benefits. There have been no cases in Nova Scotia
which define the scope of s. 55(1) and it has been noted in Hodgson
v. Brookhaven General Hospital,29 a leading American case that:
it is far from clear that the standard types of fringe benefits are
eligible for inclusion in "equal pay" determinations. 30
It might also be argued that the Trade Union Act 3 ' nullifies a
collective agreement that discriminates sexually. Section 24(7)
provides:
Sec. 24(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, no
trade union, the administration, management, or policy of which
is, in the opinion of the Board, dominated or influenced by an
employer so that its fitness to represent employees for the
purposes of collective bargaining is impaired or which
discriminates against any person because of sex, race, creed,
color, nationality, ancestry or place of origin, shall be certified as
that bargaining agent of the employees, nor shall an agreement
entered into between that trade union and that employer be
deemed to be a collective agreement.
The best available avenue of redress against a pension plan that
discriminates in its contributions and benefits remains with the
complaint and inquiry procedure under the Human Rights Act. The
Human Rights Commission's approach of low-key conciliation is
inexpensive and may achieve results if the Commission accepts the
suggestion that there is in fact a breach of the Human Rights Act
involved in unequal benefits and contributions. If the pension is part
of a collective agreement there might be recourse to the Labour
Relations Board under s.24 of the Trade Union Act and a complaint
29. 436 F. 2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970)
30. S.N.S. 1972, c. 19
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to the Director of Labour Standards under the Labour Standards
Code is still a possibility.
IX. Conclusion
There is probably no solution to inequalities in the impact of
pension plans which arise in a work world which continues to be
male-oriented. For the narrower problem of unequal benefits and
contributions the guidelines of the Ontario Employment Standards
Act simply do not go far enough. The only real solution is the
statutory rejection of actuarial tables based on sex. Certainly there
can be no excuse for the failure of Nova Scotia to tackle the problem
at least to the extent of the Ontario legislature. This could be done
by bringing pension benefits clearly within the scope of s. 55(1) of
the Labour Standards Code, with exceptions, if necessary, by
regulation. Alternatively the application of the Nova Scotia Human
Rights Act could be clarified. Until this can be accomplished there
remain no effective remedies in Nova Scotia against discrimination
in pension plans.
